Paris

Macedonia/FYROM: Changing Government, Changing Name?

By Andreas Pacher | 15 June 2017

Fresh optimism brightens the prospects for a resolution of the name dispute which has been hampering Skopje’s path into the NATO and the EU. Both the new Macedonian government and the Greek Foreign Minister have signaled unusual goodwill for a soon-to-reach compromise. While some analysts assert that the ‘China factor’ may tone down Skopje’s thrust to the West, such a view is overly simplistic and should not pollute the hopes for a political reconciliation.

With Sebastian Kurz, Austria Further Heads Into Personalized Politics

By Anonyme | 27 May 2017

In a bold move that created a political list eponymously named after himself, the 30-year old Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz broke up Austria’s entrenched political order. He re-centered the conservative party – which had been in urgent need of reform – towards himself. This appraisal seeks to identify some factors of the continued success Kurz had been enjoying ever since he entered high governmental posts at the age of 24, but it also raises questions about how personalized politics further weakens the Austrian political parties.

Becoming Ukrainian. The context of national indifference in Ukraine

By Yana Hryshko | 24 April 2017

In the history of independent Ukraine, we can distinguish three periods of rising nationalism with rising national indifference in response. The topic has always been strongly influenced by the ‘Russia factor’. Moreover, the occurrence of national indifference was highly politicized, raising both nationalism and national indifference to the rank of a problem, issue, and even threat. In this article, I try to describe the origin of national indifference in Ukraine, the specificity of Ukrainian nationalism and the evolution of these two opposite yet intertwined phenomena.

From the Dolomites to Galicia – national indifference and “Habsburg patriotism” in the Austro-Hungarian empire’s literature

By Balázs Gyimesi | 22 April 2017

The Habsburg empire’s literature offers an intriguing landscape of Habsburg patriotism, which can be seen as a form of “national indifference”, a response to specific societal and political changes which affected the empire in its last decades, such as secularisation and nationalisation. This form of multi-layered belonging, having both territorial and religious anchors, but ultimately being attached to the institution of the Habsburg monarchy, was masterfully demonstrated in Roth’s chef-d’oeuvre, “Radetzky March” (1932). Through an analysis of fiction and nonfiction works of authors born in the Austro-Hungarian empire, the article will explore the notions of Habsburg patriotism, national indifference and a possible contemporary manifestation of the latter phenomenon, a form of “European patriotism”.

How European can be a Post-Soviet Korean?

By Svetlana Kim | 22 April 2017

Disinterest towards one’s own nationality may be regarded as indifference, but this indifference is nuanced. For example, most of the post-Soviet Koreans who increasingly settle in the EU today seem well-assimilated and unconcerned about their identities, but they still continue to live their deeply ingrained national traditions. National indifference can therefore be dynamically combined with the concept of a ‘dormant diaspora’.

No European to receive the EU’s cultural prizes

By Andreas Pacher | 22 April 2017

The EU’s cultural policy is characterized by a structural oxymoron: The EU pursues European identity-building via a national framework. While the locus of EU cultural policies is delegated onto co-opted national organizations, the main share of successful identity-building discourse is arrogated by the EU. It is the eternal dialectic between Member States and supranational interests that leads to this institutional conundrum. The EU Prize for Literature serves as an illustration.

The Orders of Friendship in (Post-)Socialist Countries

By Andreas Pacher | 24 March 2017

Several (post-)Socialist governments established new state awards in the past years, which all carry the name ‘Order of Friendship’. The term ‘friendship’ here is genealogically related to the Stalinist concept of ‘friendship of peoples’. Western political theories, on the other hand, have largely abandoned this appellation in international relations. The burgeoning of ‘friendship orders’ is culturally contingent on a collectivist mindset, while the general popularity of state awards can be attributed to the increasing attention governments pay to public diplomacy.

Being Friends with Transnistria: Emotional Politics via State Awards

By Andreas Pacher | 18 February 2017

By exclusively targeting foreign citizens, the Transnistrian “Order of Friendship” is confined to a limited scope: The tiny republic enjoys recognition only by a few Russian-backed breakaway regions. The recipients therefore consist of disputed leaders from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, some Russian politicians with influential NGOs, and a Soviet-era singer whose connection with the Donbass placed him on the EU’s list of sanctioned people. The political logic revealed in the government’s implicit criteria for “awardworthiness” is that of a narrow understanding of diplomacy.

China and Poland: Economic Cooperation Under the 16+1 Formula

By Yao Le | 1 February 2017

Why do China and Poland view each other as significant partners under the 16+1 formula? Based on a comparative analysis of the two countries’ respective goals and expectations, this article will put forth possible explanations, and point towards options the Chinese government could address to promote the Sino-Polish cooperation a step further.

Does the Turkish Stream Fuel the “Anti-Visegrad Alliance”?

By Andreas Pacher | 3 October 2016

Russia and Turkey agreed to build the Turkish Stream pipeline in August 2016. This benefits Bulgaria and Greece in their ambitions to become a common regional gas hub. Potential supplies of LNG, shale gas, and natural gas from Azerbaijan make this even more realizable. Despite the V4’s opposing stakes in energy policy (not wanting to “lose” Ukraine), talks about a Graeco-Bulgarian Anti-Visegrad Alliance are exaggerated.

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